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INTRODUCTION 
Few men in the history of American business have been more contra-
versial than ,Jay Gould. His accomplishments and failures left an indelible 
mark on United States business life. .~lthough mudi has been written about 
Gould's life and business career, no study has related a technical analysis 
of the Southwestern rail stock price movements to his railroad ventures in 
the South\~estern United States. It is the purpose of this study to present 
a historical review of Gould's acquisitions in the southwest and to explore 
the implications of these ventures on the public and business sectors of 
the American economy. Utilizing stock price changes, the thesis attempts 
to explain more fully the relationship of Gould's security trading practices 
to his Southwestern rail road system. Several technical patterns and inter-
pretati ons are analyzed and compared for an overa 11 view of his activities. 
Preliminary investigation by this thesis indicates a high degree of correla-
tion between the stock price changes and Gould's formation of the South-
western railroad system. Analysis of the moral implications of Gould's 
business ventures does not come within the scope of this study. 
In organizing the thesis, it was necessary to include only Gould's 
Southwestern rail activities and his associated railroad investments. 
Although many of Gould's purchases ~tere simultaneous, the study analyzes 
each acquisition separately in hope of avoiding confusion. 
Sources containing business information on Jay Gould's activities 
included Railway Review and Railway Gazette, which provide many details 
on south~1es tern rai 1 road events. Newspapers such as the St. Louis Eveni n~ 
~=---- ==-~----=--= 
2 
Chronicle, the Austin Daily Democratic.Statesman, and the Denver Tribune 
were used to portray Gould in view of his contemporaries. Government 
publications were valuahle especially in the areas of public policy and 
its relationship to the railroads. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle 
was a valuable tool, as were the leading New York newspapers of the day. 
Secondary sources were utilized when other information was not available 
or obtainable. 
In the last chapter, the study evaluates a comparable modern 
railway problem and relates this analysis to Gould and his activities in 
the Southwest. Hopefully, the result Nill be a greater understanding of 
Jay Gould's achievements and failures. 
i g.__:..__ 
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CHAPTER I 
Feverish industrial and agricultural activity in the north during 
the Civil War, aided by rising prices, touched off a period of unprece-
dented prosperity in the years immediately following the conflict. Immense 
regions in the west had been opened up to agriculture; the large wartime 
profits had been invested freely in fixed forms of capital, notably trans-
portation facilities. Enormous amounts of invested capital financed 30,000 
miles of newly constructed rail lines between 1867-73. However, the 
prosperity was too rapid and the expenditures were too great for the 
economic well-being of the country. Cultivation of western lands only 
threw older land areas out of production and consequently reduced their 
value. Speculation ran rampant throughout the country. Poor ethics of 
politicians and capitalists, as witnessed by the Credit Mobilier and Black 
Friday scandals, contributed to the weakening of business confidence.l 
In the fall of 1873 the railroad bubble burst. An eruption of 
business failures occurred, culminating in the failure of Jay Cooke & Co., 
a leading Wall Street Firm. The New York Stock Exchange ceased trading 
as a wave of selling hit the exchange. By November, fifty-five railroads, 
including the Kansas Pacific, the Santa Fe, and the Burlington, ~lith 
securities representing one-eighth of the nation's total railroad debt, 
were in default. Industries related to the railroads failed for a lack 
of business. General iron and rail prices dropped 33 per cent and 27 per 
lHarold Underwood Faulkner, American Economic History (New York: 
Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1960), pp. 515-16. 
If ·. 
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cent respectively in one year. The September panic and the five years of 
depression which followed destroyed business confidence and left the 
national economy in the doldrums.2 
By 1878 the economy had hit bottom and was beginning to recover. 
With the rise in business activity, Jay Gould emerged as one of the nation's 
leading speculators. Using methods which were without precedent, he 
bought, sold, and traded his way to financial success. 
Born in Roxbury, New York, in 1836, Jay Gould was the son of an 
unsuccessful but determined pioneer who eeked out a living on a farm. 
Impressed in his youth by the power and prestige of the Erie Railroad, 
young Gould undoubtedly looked upon railroads as the most desirable 
possessions of man.3 Fundamentally he was a hard worker who could pursue 
a goal with patience and persuasiveness. 
For several years, Gould roamed upper New York State, working, 
saving, and making himself helpful and agreeable to those in strategic 
places. A self-styled promoter, he surveyed land, made a few maps, and 
wrote a lurid history of Delaware County, New York. However, it ~1as in his 
personal contacts, especially in a long and persistent cultivation of 
retired tannery owner Zadoc Pratt, that he proved to be most successful. 
Impressed by Gould's industry, Pratt financed the construction of a new 
tannery in Pennsylvania and then turned the business over to Gould. After 
2Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era (Princeton:· Princeton University 
Press, 1964), pp. 213,220-22,229. 
3George Alfred Townsend, 'Oay Gould," Forum, II, 1886, pp. 88, 90. 
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5 
receiving only the briefest correspondence from Gould during a nationwide 
boom in leather, Pratt unexpectedly visited the tannery. 1'1uch to his 
astonishment, he found the books in utter chaos. Further inspection 
revealed that Gould had misappropriated company funds for his own personal 
use. Pratt immediately demanded Gould resign. The partnership was 
peremptorily dissolved.4 
However, Gould gained more than he lost. Now well-known in the 
leather industry from' his previous speculative trips to New York, he had 
little trouble finding a new partner, Charles Leeup. A prominent leather 
merchant of unquestioned integrity, Leeup soon discovered that Gould was 
using Leeup's name in an attempt to corner the market in hides. The panic 
of 1847 ruined Leeup financially and Gould's speculative ventures in hides 
failed. Betrayed by Gould and bankrupt, Charles Leeup shot himself in the 
parlor of his New York mansion. Thereafter, Gould moved to New York City 
and entered the world of corporate finance. 5 
For eight years Jay Gould labored on ~Jall Street with moderate success. 
However, when he was elected to the Erie Railroad Board of Directors in 
October, 1867, he was still virtually unknown in leading financial circles. 
Gould's abilities lay in the intricate field of corporate finance and 
security trading although no one actually knows how he acquired his financial 
6 
skills and acumen. 
4 
4Hhittaker, H. R., ~Gould, Financier. 
srbi d. 
6Julius Grodinsky, ~Gould: His Business Career, 1867-1892. 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1967), p. 23. Hereafter 
cited as Grodinsky, ~Gould. 
L 
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An expert in corporate negotiation, Gould mastered more completely 
than any other person the art of purchasing worthless stocks and bonds and 
selling them to financially sound companies.? His usual practice was to 
examine corporate leases, bonds, and charters for technical or legal weak-
nesses. Once he found useful information, he sought control and proceeded 
to use the company information for personal profit. Taking advantage of 
rising economic confidence during the years 1878-1881, Jay Gould successfully 
ventured into the speculative and financially weak Southwestern railroads. 
From the onset, Gould capitalized on the favorable circumstances of low 
security prices and rising economic activity to form his Southwestern 
System. 
Gould also utilized the New York Stock Exchange whenever possible. 
Speculation and security trading on the exchange was an important business 
vocation and was certainly an important avenue for profit. Non-speculators 
regarded the exchange as an "immense gambling establishment."8 
Proficient in corporate finance, Gould also mastered the complexities 
of the national banking system and its relationship to the gold market. 
By purchasing large amounts of gold in 1873, Gould reduced the amount of 
gold in circulation causing a financial turmoil which became known as the 
"Black Friday" panic. Fearing an attempt on his life, he was protected 
?Alexander Dana Noyes, Thirty Years of American Finance (New York: 
C. P. Putnam's and Sons, 1901}, p. 63. Hereafter c1ted as Noyes, American 
Finance. 
8John F. Hume, "The Heart of Speculation," Forum, II (1886}, p. 131 •. 
Hereafter cited as Hume, "Speculation." 
1£:-c .... t::t:=--- ------ ---
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by a personal bodYguard for several years thereafter.9 
Small in stature, Gould might walk the whole length of Broadway 
without being recognized by twenty persons except when he turned the 
corner onto Wall Street. 10 Inconspicuous, Gould nevertheless commanded 
respect. ~!illiam H. Vanderbilt said of Gould: "He always displays great 
ability on whatever he may concentrate his attentions."ll Violent temper 
and unrestrained speech were all foreign to Jay Gould. Like most specu-
lators, he kept his own counsel. 
In considering the career of Jay Gould, one must recognize the 
temper of his times. Government regulation was minimal. Land grants, high 
tariffs, and other government actions aided business. The labor supply was 
adequate and funds were available for the entrepreneur. This was the 
"golden era of speculation" and "Mr. Gould was the busiest of them al1."12 
9
"Jay Gould," Railway Gazette, January 17, 1880, p. 33. 
lO"Jay Gould," Railway Review, January 17, 1880, p. 32. 
ll"Mr. Vanderbilt's Opinions," Railway Gazette, March 16, 1880, 
p. 141. 
12Hume, Speculation, p. 135. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE GOULD VENTURES, 1878-1879 
Eighteen hundred seventy-eight and eighteen hundred seventy-nine 
proved to be two of the most remarkable years in the financial history of 
the United States. Prospects for prosperity loomed brighter than in any 
year since the depression of 1873.1 
Jay Gould, who gained considerable notoriety in trying to wrest 
the Erie Railroad from the Vanderbilt interests in the years 1867 through 
1872, succeeded in gaining control of the Union Pacific in 1873. Gould's 
speculative interests next centered on the Kansas Pacific and other 
financially weak western railroads. The lines represented speculative 
security profits if they could be united with a financially strong rail-
road, which meant to Gould his own Union Pacific. 
Political turmoil lessened after the 1878 election. The defeat of 
the "Greenback" and "Silver Inflation" congressional candidates was 
decisive, and the gold standard resumed on January 1, 1879, without 
incident. Vast amounts of unoccupied western 1 ands, 01~ned by the govern-
ment and the railroads, sold briskly at low acreage prices. Settlers, 
instead of land speculators, purchased a great number of these acres. 
Large crops in 1879 coupled with a strong agricultural demand from Europe 
l"Retrospect of 1878," Commercial and Financial Chronicle, January 4, 
1879, p. 4. 
~ 
,---------
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brought farm prosperity which increased the attraction of settlement in 
the West.2 
Stock prices began to rise in 1878 with rail stocks leading as a 
result of the large eastward movement of grain. The rise was orderly and 
without speculative excesses. 3 As 1878 drew to a close, the stock market 
ended ~lith most of the issues on their highs for the year. 
I. THE KANSAS PACIFIC RAILROAD 
As head of the Union Pacific, Jay Gould played a key role in the 
affairs of the western railroads. Seeking to increase the earning power 
of the Union Pacific, Gould tried to outflank the Chicago, Burlington 
and Quincy, a line connecting the Union Pacific with Chicago, by purchasing 
the Hannibal and St. Joseph. Stymied by the Burlington and unable to 
obtain any security profits with his Union Pacific holdings, Gould started 
to accumulate securities of the financially derelict Kansas Pacific, a 
competitor to the Union Pacific, whose track connected Omaha, Nebraska, 
with the Central Pacific Railroad in Utah. 
Initially, every effort made by Gould to secure control of the 
Kansas Pacific for his merger with the Union Pacific failed. Henry Villard, 
a financier who represented the Kansas Pacific's first mortgage bondholders, 
opposed Gould's attempts to gain control. Searching for speculative profits 
2Falkner, American Economic Histor,y, p. 518; "Retrospect of 1878," 
Commercial and F1nanc1al Chronicle, January 4, 1879, p. 3. 
3"Retrospect, 1878," p. 5. 
11 
Gould purchased large amounts of Kansas Pacific junior income bonds at 
prices as low as ten cents per $1.00 face value.4 Villard, meanwhile, 
encouraged his clients to purchase the senior first mortgage bonds.5 
After considerable negotiation, the Kansas City Pool Agreement, an 
arrangement to harmonize the interests of the junior and senior bond-
holders, was signed by Gould, Villard, and other financiers.6 
Despite the apparent agreement, Gould was for the moment stymied 
in his efforts to gain further concessions from the Kansas Pacific. 
Lacking capital for a more concerted attack on the Kansas Pacific and 
other railroads, Gould decided to sell a major portion of his Union 
Pacific stock to secure additional funds. Of the 370,000 shares of Union 
Pacific stock outstanding, Jay Gould controlled 200,000. Ho~tever, any 
large scale selling by Gould would have depressed the price of Union 
Pacific stock very rapidly.? Gould, however, found a way to sell his 
stock without depressing the price. An announcement signified the "great 
event of the week in Hall Street": Jay Gould had sold 50,000 shares of 
Union Pacific stock to a syndicate led by his friend Russell Sage, along 
with an option to purchase an additional 50,000 shares on ca11.8 
4united States Congress, Senate, United States Pacific Railwa 
Commission Report: 1887, Vol. 1, 50th Congress, 1st Session, Has ington: 
Government Printing Office, 1880), p. 463. Hereafter cited as Pacific 
Railway Report: 1887. See Appendix, Tables I and II for the composition 
of the Kansas Ci~ool Agreement. 
5Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 141. 
6Pacific Railway Report: 1887, p. 51. 
7Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 162. 
8commercial and Financial Chronicle, Februa~y 28, 1879, p. 200. 
----
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Now ready, Gould pursued his attack on the status quo in the western rail-
roads. In effect, Gould sold his Union Pacific stock to purchase Habash 
and Kansas Pacific stock and form a competitive system to the Union 
Pacific. The ultimate goal •Has a merger that would provide security 
profits. 
The attack began with Gould's efforts to purchase the !vabash 
Railroad primarily because of its strategic location as a potential 
eastern outlet for the Kansas Pacific. It was the only railroad that had 
a line from Toledo, Ohio, to St. Louis, Missouri. 9 Also, as the Railway 
Gazette later reported, the acquisition of the Wabash would enable Gould 
to harmonize the Habash interests with those of the Union Pacific. 10 
However, a difficult corporate problem confronted Gould. Commodore 
C. K. Garrison, seeking to establish a system of his own, and therefore an 
opponent of Gould's,controlled the Missouri Pacific, the \•Jabash, and a 
feeder 1 i ne, the St. Louis, Kansas City, and Northern. Vii th Garrison's 
E 
~-~--
~-__ -,-:,_--==-'-= 
F 
i' --
seemingly strong strategic position, the Habash seemed an unlikely recipient ~"-~~~~ 
for Gould's interest and money. 11 In an effort to strengthen his position 
against Garrison, Gould purchased control of the Central Branch Union 
Pacific, a feeder line to the Kansas Pacific and by traffic interchange to 
the Missouri Pacific and ~-!abash. The purchase was a double blow to Gould's 
9Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 194. 
lOApril 23, 1880, p. 220. 
llcommercial and Financial Chronicle, February 22, 1879, p. 200. 
~ -- -----
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opponents in the Hest. Gould not only increased his bargaining position 
with the financially derelict Kansas Pacific, but also effectively 
stopped Garrison's plan to expand the Missouri Pacific west from Kansas 
City into Kansas. Pressed further by declining stock prices and law 
suits, Garrison sold his interest in the Wabash to Gould. 
In addition to the purchase of the Habash, Gould acquired 40,300 
shares of the 100,000 shares of Kansas Pacific stock outstanding.l2 
Attempting to end his continuing differences with financier Henry Villard 
who at this time was threatening the Kansas Pacific with foreclosure, 
Gould agreed to pay all interest arrearages to Villard and the senior 
bondholders and then as the largest single securi~y holder, he took control 
of the''Kansas Pacific. 
Seeking profits for his Kansas Pacific holdings through a merger, 
Gould, as head of the Kansas Pacific, suggested combining the Union Pacific 
and the Kansas Pacific. Rebuffed by the Union Pacific Board of Directors 
Gould demonstrated his brilliance as a railroad strategist and tactician. 13 
Unable to reach St. Louis or Denver, the Union Pacific had to consider the 
frightening prospect of insolvency if both the Kansas Pacific and Union 
Pacific competed for the same traffic in the sparsely settled area. Gould, 
realizing the Union Pacific's position, purchased the Denver Pacific, 
thereby 1 inking the Kansas Pacific's Denver terminus with Cheyenne and 
1.2Pacific Railway Report: 1887, p. 463. 
13Gould became a minority stockholder through his Union Pacific 
sale to the Sage syndicate. Although he was still on the Board of Directors, 
his influence had declined as a result of the sale. 
E----
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cutting into Union Pacific feeder traffic. At the same time Gould also 
became an important influence in the Denver, South Park and Pacific, a 
road that had access to the Colorado mine traffic.14 Continuing his 
attacks against the Union Pacific, Gould proposed to extend the Kansas 
Pacific to Oregon. llith the Union Pacific on the defensive, Gaul d waited 
for an offer of merger. As he had foreseen, the Union Pacific capitulated 
during the negotiations that ensued. Gould was in the enviable position 
of both buyer and seller since he still owned a small block of Union 
Pacific stock. 
Vlhen the merger was announced, profits were reaped by many who 
held Kansas Pacific and other branch line securities which were exchanged 
for high quality Union Pacific securities. However, as Vincent M. 
Masterson has commented, "It was to Gould, as the chief owner of the 
Kansas Pacific and holder of the Denver Pacific stock outstanding, that 
the lion's share of the profits went." Gould had purchased the Kansas 
Pacific stock for as little as $12.50 a share as early as 1871, while 
the Denver Pacific stock was obtained at no cost with the purchase of 
DP.nver Pacific Bonds.15 
Gould's strategy included the formation of a new corporation with 
a capital stock equal to the sum of the stocks of the old constituent 
14Arthur ~1. Johnson and Barry E. Supple, Boston Ca italists and 
~/estern Railroads, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967 , p:-2"43. 
Hereafter cited as Johnson, Western Rail roads. 
15racifi c Railway Report: 1887, p. 559. 
s=--
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companies--The Union Pacific, Kansas Pacific, and Denver Pacific.16 The 
exchange of the old securities was on a dollar-for-dollar basis for 
stocks of the new corporation. In essence, the Union Pacific diluted its 
earning power and credit with the exchange of Union Pacific securities for 
the virtually worthless securities of the Kansas Pacific and Denver 
Pacific. 
II. THE ST.LOUIS, KANSAS CITY AND NORTHERN 
Prior to the merger of the Kansas Pacific and the Union Pacific, 
Gould completed a small consolidation that reportedly netted him profits 
of $4,800,000.17 When Gould took control of the Wabash, he privately 
purchased large blocks of the St. Louis, Kansas City, and Northern stock. 
The common stock sold at $7.50 and the preferred stock at $30.00 a share 
prior to Gould's acquisition of the Habash. In July, 1879, the Wabash 
announced the consolidation of the two lines. 18 When the merger news 
became public, the price of the common and preferred stocks were $47.00 and 
$72.00 respectively.l9 
III. THE POTENTIAL RAILROAD MONOPOLY 
Early in 1880 the Austin Daily Democratic Statesman stated, 
16Johnson, Western Railroads, p. 249. 
17"The Gould Speculations," Railway Gazette, April 23, 1880, p. 217. 
Hereafter cited as "Gould Speculations." 
18commercial and Financial Chronicle, July 12, 1879, p. 42. 
l9"Gould Speculations,'' p. 217. See also Appendix Table III. 
¥~-'---
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"Gould's great object seems to be the control of the transcontinental 
trade. u20 11ith the vJabash and Kansas Pacific mergers completed, Gould 
cast his eyes on the fragmented Southwestern railroads. By acquiring the 
strategically located but unaffiliated railroads, and by building the 
necessary lines to link them into a system, he could forge a trans-
portation monopoly'in the Southwest. During the next two years, he 
proceeded to turn these dreams into reality. 
20January 21, 1880, p. 2. Hereafter cited as the Daily Statesman. 
~---
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CHAPTER III 
THE SOUTHVJESTERN SYSTEM, 1879-1880 
During the year 1879, the railroad picture in the southwest began 
to change very rapidly with the entry of Jay Gould. "The conquest was 
rapid," said Julius Grodinsky, "indeed in American history there had 
been probably no"other system built in such a short time."l By the end 
of 1880 Jay Gould became the dominant factor in Southwestern railroad 
activity. 
I. THE ~1ISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD 
On May 12, 1849, the Missouri General Assembly chartered the Pacific 
Railroad of Missouri to build a line from St. Louis to a point on the 
western border of the State. James Kirkwood, a noted engineer of the 
period, completed the surveys for the route. Construction commenced on 
the first section of the railroad to Cheltenham, Missouri, a distance of 
five miles, on July 14, 1851. Passenger service to Cheltenham began on 
December 9, 1852.2 
With the onset of the Ci vi1 Vlar tn 1861, Pacific Rail road 
construction temporarily ceased. The lines western terminus was then at 
Sedalia, ninety-five miles from the proposed western border. Building 
activity began anew just before the war ended and the last ninety-five 
1Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 244. 
2Moody's Transportation Manual, (New York: Robert H. Messner, 1968), 
p. 279. Hereafter cited as Moody's Manual. 
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miles were completed to Kansas City. Construction resumed after the Civil 
v/ar, and the rai 1 road soon extended to Leavenworth and Atchison. 3 
After considerable financial difficulty, the railroad was acquired 
by a group of eastern financiers, led by Commodore C. K. Garrison. 
Thereafter the railroad reorganized as the Missouri Pacific Railway. 
Coinciding with the purchase of the Missouri Pacific, Garrison also 
acquired the Wabash Railroad, the only railroad leading to St. Louis from 
the northeast, and the St. Louis, Kansas City, and Northern. It was 
against Garrison's enviable position in the Southwest that Jay Gould 
leveled his attack in 1879.4 
Gould soon confronted Garrison with lawsuits and other tactics 
designed to end Garrison's hold over the Habash. With Gould's purchase 
of the Central Branch Union Pacific, Garrison gave up his efforts to unite 
and expand his raHroads. The l!/abash and other Garrison controlled rail-
roads soon passed to Gould. 
After Gould successfully purchased the Habash and the St. Louis, 
Kansas City, and Northern, he offered to purchase the Missouri Pacific 
from Garrison. During testimony before the United States Pacific Rail-
way Commission in 1887, Gould gave the following description of his 
dealings with Garrison: "Mr. Garrison had projected roads out in the 
Kansas Pacific territory paralleling it to an extent, and I went and 
saw him and had a story session or b/0. ,.5 
3Ibid., p. 279. 
4see Chapter II. 
5Pacific Railway Report: 1887, p. 509. 
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Throughout these "stormy sessions" with Garrison, Gould threatened 
to extend the Kansas Pacific as far east as Garrison extended the Hissouri 
Pacific west. The threats were a typical Gould tactic. After Gould 
purchased the Central Branch 'Union Pacific, which had been vital to 
Garrison's expansion plans, Garrison decided to sell the ~1issouri Pacific. 
Gould quoted Garrison as saying, "You had better buy me out; that is the 
cheapest way."6 However, Gould still had problems. Garrison rejected 
the first offer on the grounds it was too low. When Gould decided to 
accept a higher figure, the Commodore raised the ante. Finally the price 
agreed upon was $3,800,000--approximately $1,800,000 higher than the 
original asking price.? Control of the road passed to Jay Gould on 
November 13, 1879.8 
Included in the sale of the Missouri Pacific were two small branch 
lines and an option to purchase the narrow-gaage Kansas Central Railroact. 9 
Hhen Gould proposed to unite the Kansas Pacific with the Union Pacific, he 
had acquired the Missouri Pacific, Kansas Pacific, ~Jabash, and several 
smaller rail lines, which, when linked together, formed a system competing 
with the Union Pacific. Only then did the real significance of the 
6Ibid., p. 509. 
7Henry Clews, Fifty Years in Wall Street (New York: Irving Publishing 
House, 1908), p. 646. ---
8In testimony in 1887, Gould stated that he paid $3,000,000 for 4,000 
shares of Missouri Pacific stock. However, since the actual price was not 
disclosed at the time of the sale, the financial papers generally accepted 
the $3,800,000 figure. 
9see Appendix Table IV. 
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~~i ssouri Pacific purchases become apprent. The Missouri Pacific was the 
cornerstone and the eastern outlet for the newly formed system. "His 
co,lleagues in the Union Pacific management were informed that it was his 
purpose to carry his enterprise to the Pacific Ocean." 10 \~i th this 
objective in view the extraordinary purchases of the Missouri Pacific, at 
prices which did not bear any relation to the value of the properties, 
could readily be explained.ll 
An interview between Gould and the Union Pacific management was held 
on January 14, 1880, and a subsequent agreement was drawn up. The nego-
tiations ~1ere "a speedy but complete surrender to his demands." 12 Referring 
to the merger, the New York Times stated: "Gould succeeded in managing 
the matter pretty conclusively."l3 To the general public, Gould had seem-
ingly changed from a speculator to a railroad manager.l4 
II. THE TEXAS AND PACIFIC RAILROAD 
After completion of the merger between the Kansas Pacific and 
the Union Pacific, Gould sought control of the Texas Pacific, the second 
railroad he desired for his future Southwestern system. The Texas Pacific 
lDPacific Raihqay Report: 1887, pp. 60-61 
llrbi d. 
12rbid. See Appendix, Tables V-VII for further details of the 
merger. 
13"Gould's Great Monopoly," New York Times, January 20, 1880, p. 1. 
14commercial and Financial Chronicle, January 10, 1880, p. 30. 
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origin ally had been planned and promoted by one of the ablest groups of 
railroad capitalists in the country. In the early 1870's, T. A. Scott, 
with the help of an eastern group of financiers as well as a land grant, 
had p 1 an ned a rail road to run from the Louisiana-Texas border to San 
Diego, California. The depression of the 1870's, however, ended all 
construction outside of Texas, and the Texas and Pacific fai 1 ed to 
accomplish its projected construction program by 1879. 15 In 1880, the 
main line extended from Shreveport, Louisiana, to Fort vlorth, Texas, and 
from Texarkana, Texas, to Sherman, Texas. Adding other minor lines, the 
total track was 444 miles. 16 
Unable to obtain either Congressional help or public financing on 
the open market, the Texas & Pacific turned to Jay Gould. Early in 1880 
the Railway Review announced the organization of the Pacific Improvement 
Company, the construction company which would complete the Texas & Pacific 
Railroad. 17 tvith a paid-in capital of $1,000,000 stock control of the 
Pacific Improvement Company rested with the following speculators: General 
Dodge, G. Morrosini, E. L. Adams, G. N. Pullman, 11. L. Scott, C. F. 
!ioerishieffer, Gould associates Sidney Dillon and Russell Sage, and Jay 
Gould. 18 
The newly formed syndicate planned to complete a line from Fort 
15Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 253. 
16Raih1ay Gazette, August 3, 1880, p. 436. 
l7January 3, 1880, p. 5. 
18Railway Review, January 10, 1880, p. 18; New York Times, January 
6, 1880, p. 4. 
[~ 
""----
~----- -:.:==~= 
= 
t ___ _ 
24 
in completing the line. Taking advantage of his success with the Texas 
s, Pacific, Gould had "New Orleans rejoicing in the prospect" that a 
rail road 11oul d be built from the city of Shreveport. At a meeting of the 
Board of Directors on April 10, 1880, Gould and Scott completed terms. 
Although all parties "hoped for" a quick commencement of construction, it 
wasn't until July 17, 1880, that a contract was let to the Gould-sponsored 
construction company. The contract stipulated that the rail line be completed 
in eighteen months. 23 Creditors, in the meantime, consented to be paid at 
fifty cents on the dollar. 24 In one stroke, Jay Gould had eliminated 
one half of the outstanding debt. 
Control of the railroad rested with the original owners until such 
time as forty miles of track were laict. 25 Then according to the construction 
agreement, sufficient amounts of stock would be transferred to the syndicate 
to control the railroad. 
In an effort to obtain greater profits, Gould sought to transfer an 
additional land grant to the New Orleans Pacific from the New Orleans, 
Baton Rouge, and Vicksburg Railroad. Commonly referred to as the "Backbone," 
the Vicksburg line supposedly lost its land grant before it completed road 
construction. However, Gould discovered that the lands had been illegally 
withdrawn and still were held in reserve. 26 He reached an agreement with 
23 Railway Review, April 17, 1880, p. 184. 
24commercial and Financial Chronicle, p. 434. 
25Raihlay Gazette, July 23, 1880, p. 402. 
26 George H. Julian, "Railway Influence in the Land Office," North 
American Review (New York: 1883), p. 253. 
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Horth, Texas, to El Paso, Texas, by January 1, 1883. The railroad agreed 
to pay the syndicate the costs of construction by issuing first mortgage 
bonds to them at $20,000 per mile, and as a bonus, an equal amount of 
stock.19 \4ith the stock market rising late in 1879 and continuing through 
1880, the securities paid to the syndicate proved to be very profitable. 
Eventually the syndicate reaped a profit of 700 per cent.20 
Thomas A. Scott reported to the Texas & Pacific stockholders a 
few months later in 1880 that the road had a surplus of $3,000,000 in first 
mortgage bonds, $600,000 of income bonds and land grant bonds, and no 
floating debt. "This r,eserve of securities will not only insure a well-
constructed and fully equipped road, but will enable your company to 
maintain the very strong financial condition which it now enjoys," said 
T. A. Scott.21 Jay Gould had similar thoughts; by the time the Texas & 
Pacific stockholders met again, he was president of the line.22 
III. THE NE\4 ORLEANS PACIFIC RAILROAD 
Dormant for years, the New Orleans Pacific consisted in 1880 of 
100 miles of roadbed and a land grant. There was little hope of completion 
until 1880 when Gould and fellow financier, T. A. Scott, announced interest 
19New York Times, Janu,ary 6, 1880, p. 4. 
20New York Times, January 10, 1885. 
21Railway Gazette, July 23, 1880, p. 402; Railwav Review, August 
21, 1880, p. 430. 
22Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 256. 
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W. L Scott, the largest shareholder, to pool a majority of the Bacl<bone's 
stock and to transfer the land grant to the New Orleans Pacific. 
Eventually the 1 and grant passed to the construction company. 27 
Although the New Orleans Pacific was supposedly easy to build 
because of its location, construction difficulties soon arose. 28 According 
to contemporary reports, "unprecendented cold weather" and the "scarcity of 
experienced 1 abor" hindered progress. 29 However, by December, 1880, the 
railroad announced that it would commence operation over its lines except 
for the last uncompleted seventy-five miles. 30 After the announcement, the 
Gou1d-infl!Aenced Board of Directors proposed the consolidation of the 1 ine 
with the Texas & Pacific, thereby 1 inking Texas with New Orleans. 31 The 
effect of such a report only increased the enthus'iasm of Texas businessmen 
who considered New Orleans an "admirable base" for supplying the Lone 
Star State with a great many heavy goods. 32 Future business and railroad 
expansion prospects were exceedingly bright as Jay Gould expanded his 
Southwestern Empire. 
IV. THE MISSOURI, KANSAS AND TEXAS RAILROAD 
Consisting of a line from Holden, Missouri, to Paola, Kansas, and 
27Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 258; New York Times, January 10, 1885. 
28Railway Gazette, July 23, 1880, p. 402. 
29Ibid., ~1ay 6, 1881, p. 254. 
30Daily Statesman, December 22, 1880, p. 1. 
31Railway Gazette, December 3, 1880, p. 652. 
32oaily Statesman, June 27, 1880, p. 2; Railway Gazette, August 13, 
1880, p. 436. 
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a line from Parsons, Kansas, to Junction City, Kansas, the Missouri, 
Kansas & Texas covered a total of 786 miles. However, despite its 
excellent location, the road fell into receivership during the depression 
of the 1870's. Reorganization 1 as ted only a short time and was succeeded 
by a unique scheme arising out of financial necessity.33 Control of the 
line did not pass to the stockholders as is normal after receivership. 
Rather, the property was placed in trust under an agreement with the Union 
Trust Company of New York.34 The railroad issued income bonds for the 
past due interest and the floating debt. 35 
The Missouri, Kansas and Texas was vital to Gould's growing system 
in the Southwest. But before he could gain control of the rail line, he 
had to battle C. E. Perkins, manager of the Burlington and Quincy Railroad, 
who considered the Missouri, Kansas & Texas as a natural extension of 
the Burlington. In the late 1870's Perkins launched the Burlington on an 
expansion program 11hich carried the line into Colorado, Nebraska, and 
Hyoming. The clash with Gould became inevitable as Gould secured the 
Missouri Pacific, the Wabash and other lines thus invading Burlington 
territory and earning power. Gould's efforts to control the Missouri, 
Kansas & Texas produced a quick but spectacular fight. Although Perkins 
considered the common stock to be worthless because of the large bonded 
debt, Gould began to buy until he purchased a majority interest. Then 
33Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 234. 
34New York Daily Tribune, January 28, 1880, p. 8. 
35Railway Gazette, November 12, 1880, p. 599, 
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he tendered $800,000, together with the $250,000 cash in the railroad's 
treasury to the Union Trust Company to pay for the defaulted interest 
coupons. 36 With the defaulted interest paid, control could pass to the 
stockholders. Gould immediately demanded the return of the company to the 
stockholders and as the dominate stockholder took control of the company 
in January, 1880. 37 Thus Gould eliminated the Burlington's opportunity 
. to control the ~1issouri, Kansas & Texas. 
V. THE INTERNATIONAL GREAT NORTHERN RAILROAD 
The International Great Northern Railroad was promoted by a group 
of New York Capitalists and planned as a through route to the Rio Grande 
from Longview, Texas, to Laredo, Texas. The International fell victim to 
the financial crisis of 1873. Construction ceased while the road was 
still many miles from its intended goal in south~testern Texas. Lacking 
the necessary capital, the line failed to complete its construction within 
the time limits specified by the charter. Expansion plans began to revive 
in 1880 when the State of Texas instituted law suits to relieve the State 
from its obligations incurred under the provisions of the land grant. 38 
In an effort to retain its land grant, the International Great Northern 
commenced construction on a line to San Antonio in July, 1880. 
36commercial and Financial Chronicle, November 12, 1880, p. 510. 
37New York Daily Tribute, January 28, 1880, p. 8. 
38Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 261. 
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Rumors of Jay Gould's interest appeared suddenly in December, 1880. 
At first the rumors were denied by sources close to the railroad. However, 
the rumors proved to be true; Gould purchased control of the road in 
December, 1880, and now possessed all the rail lines leading to St. Louis 
except the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern.39 The Iron Mountain 
was the next road to fall into Gould's hands. 
VI. THE ST. LOUIS, I RON MOUNTAIN AND SOUTHERN RAILROAD 
Originally formed in 1837 by Missouri financiers, the St. Louis & 
Bellevue ~Hneral Railroad, as it was originally called, was rechartered 
in 1851 under the name St. Louis, I ron ~1ountai n and Southern. It had the 
distinction of being the first railroad to be surveyed west of the Missouri 
River .• although construction was slow. Business commenced between St. 
Louis and Pilot Knob in 1858. A $3,501,000 loan from the State of Missouri 
during this period enabled the company to meet its construction obligations. 
Defaulting on its interest payments in September, 1866, control of the 
line passed to the State of Missouri who operated the company through a 
Board of Commissioners for three months.4° 
On January 12, 1867, Thomas Allen, the future president of the 
line purchased the railroad and promised to extend the rail lines to 
39oaily Statesman, May 12, 1880. p. 2. 
40Railway Review, Dei!jember 18, 1880, p. 664. 
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Columbus, Kentucky, 41 and to expend $500,000 per year for five years on 
improvements or extensions. 42 Confirmation of Allen's title to the rail-
road came only after considerable litigation. However, the line prospered 
and grew steadily under Allen's control. 
By the middle of 1880, Gould challenged Allen's control of the 
Iron Mountain by his Southwestern rail purchases. Much to his dismay, 
Allen saw his line effectively surrounded by Gould-controlled railroads. 
During Gould's negotiations for the Missouri Pacific, Allen had foreseen 
Gould's motives and had advised Commodore Garrison to buy the Missouri, 
l(ansas & Texas and to merge the 1 i ne into the Missouri Pacific. However, 
Garrison declined Allen's advice; eventually Gould completed the purchase 
of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas. 43 
Interchange traffic between the Iron Mountain and the Texas and 
Pacific soon faced an uncertain future as the Texas line began to expand 
. 44 .. I 1ts lines west1qard. Allen considered the Gould-formed Pac1f1c mprove-
ment Company as adverse to the interests of the Iron Mountain. 45 During 
December, 1880, negotiations took place between Gould and Allen to harmonize 
41 The actual agreement read to extend the line to Columbus, Kentucky, 
or a point on the r1ississippi River just opposite or below. 
42Railway Review, December 18, 1880, p. 664. 
43Ibid. 
44Ibid., April 10, 1880, p. 176. 
45Ibid., December 18, 1880, p. 664. 
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the interests of both railroads. 46 However, "the combined money and 
influence of a combination such as that of Messrs. Gould, Sage, Dillon, 
and their associates" frightened Allen. Elected to the United States 
Senate in November, Allen decided to sell the Iron Mountain to prevent, 
in his words, "quarrels" and to secure "harmony" among the railroads 
that entered St. Louis.47 
Gould purchased 40,000 shares from Allen and 20,000 shares from 
Henry C. Marquand, the Vice-President of the Iron Mountain. Other small 
purchases brought Gould's holdings to 70,000 shares--slightly short of an 
absolute majority. However, the amount was sufficient to give Gould 
control over the road. 48 Gould now dominated all of the main railroads 
leaving St. Louis to the Southwest. 
VII. THE GALVESTON, HOUSTON AND HENDERSON RAILROAD 
In December, 1871, the Galveston, Houston, and Henderson, a small 
line that had access to the port of Galveston, came out of reorganization 
with a funded debt of $1,500,000 and a capital stock valued at $1,500,000. 
Like so many strategically located railroads, the small Galveston Line 
had long been in financial trouble, and Gould saw a new opportunity to 
46Evening Chronicle (St. Louis, Missouri}, December 13, 1880, p. 2; 
New York Daily Tribune, December 14, 1880, p. 5; Railway Gazette, December 
u, 1880, p. 678. 
47Railway Review, December 18, 1880, p. 664. 
48commercial and Financial Chronicle, December 26, 1880, p. 653; 
New York Daily Tribuiie;"" December 16, 1880, p. 1; Railway Review, December 
18, 1880, p. 664. 
,_ 
F--~~-~:;:;_~ 
~- -
r:;--
--- --
31 
expand his system and gain a.ccess to the port. A large floating (non-
funded) debt existed for several years. ~~ith his friend Russell Sage, 
Gould purchased a majority of the outstanding mortgage bonds. As majority 
bondholders, they elected themselves as trustees for the line and then 
foreclosed and bought the property at the sale. Eventually the Inter-
national Great Northern leased the Galveston line. Gould now possessed 
"the great terminal link to Galveston."49 
* * * * * * * 
Jay Gould in less than three years formed a railroad system by 
exchanging his Union Pacific interests for the financially weak western 
rail lines. Combining the western lines into competitive system, Gould 
threatened the Union Pacific with ruinous competition. Facing possible 
insolvency, the Union Pacific bowed to Gould's pressure and agreed to his 
merger terms. This resulted in large profits for Gould when the merger 
was consummated. Then using these profits he purchased the Missouri 
Pacific and Wabash lines and expanded into the southwest, thus forming his 
Southwestern System. However, the system still needed to be expanded and 
consolidated before it was completed. In one more year, Gould completed 
the system and in doing so established a railroad monopoly in the Southwest.50 
49commercial and Financial Chronicle, July 10, 1881, p. 45; March 
19, 1881, p. 312; Grodinsky, ~Gould, pp. 265-66; Railway Gazette, July 
16, 1880, p. 386. 
50Noyes, American Finance, p. 64. See also Appendix, Tables VIII-
XV for details concerning the railroads discussed in Chapter III. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SOUTH\~ESTERN SYSTEM, 1880-1881 
Established as a powerful railroad figure in the Southwest, Jay 
Gould sa\~ an optimistic business world in the years 1880-1881. Railroad 
expansion increased and to Gaul d this meant further speculative profits 
in the Southwest. 
I. ST. LOlliS AND COI1PLIMENTARY INVESTMENTS 
St. Louis was headquarters for the Missouri Pacific, the cornerstone 
in the Gould Southwestern Railroad System. From St. Louis the rumors 
eminated far and wide on activities concerning the Southwestern System. 
St. Louis accepted the Gould influence with optimism. "Control by 
Jay Gould of the Southwestern system of railroads will prove to be a good 
thing for St. Louis," stated the Evening Chronicle. 1 Gould's non-railroad 
investments enhanced the city's efforts to make the St. Louis a major 
commercial center. In 1880, Gould purchased two barge lines between St. 
Louis and New Orleans. 2 Consolidation of the two lines occurred soon after 
with a combined capital of $3,000,000 an increase of $1,200,000. The 
consolidated barge line consisted of twenty-three tugs and 149 barges with 
an 8,000,000 bushel capacity. 3 
P. 1. 
loecember 18, 1880, p. 1 
2The Daily Gazette, (Colo~ado Springs, Colorado), August 12, 1880, 
Hereafter cited as the Da1l y Gazette. 
3Railway Review, August 27, 1880, p. 466. 
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Many citizens felt the city was "adapted for the focus of a vast 
trade if the railroads but work for her interest." The Evening Chronicle 
expressed the opinion: "St. Louis could become a shipping port for grain 
to Europe."4 The statements were not without foundation. Control of the 
barge lines enabled Gould to by-pass the railroads east of the Mississippi 
and to ship directly to New Orleans at lower freight rates. In January, 
not only was grain backed up in St. Louis for lack of storage, but an 
additional three hundred cars full of grain stood on the rail line to 
St. Louis. The grain awaited storage and eventual trans-shipment. 5 
Other Gould investments included an interest in the Vulcan Steel 
Works, which provided the Southwestern System with a source of new rails. 6 
Across the river from St. Louis, Gould purchased a share in the cattle 
stockyards and activated several coal mines in the Indian Territory 
(Oklahoma) for locomotive fuel.? 
To St. Louis Gould was the great railroad man she always wanted. 8 
Seemingly, whenever Jay Gould visited St, Louis, rumors began to spread. 9 
4oecember 18, 1880, p. 1. 
5Evening Chronicle, January 17, 1881, p. 2. 
6rbid., February 8, 1881, p. 2. 
7Railway Review, August 27, 1881, p. 476. 
8Evening Chronicle, December 18, 1880, p. 1. 
9In the west, the Denver Tribune wrote about the interest generated 
by Jay Gould: "It is believed that Jay Gould will surpass Vanderbilt as 
Railroad King." This followed an earlier statement from the same source 
boasting that Denver wquld become one of the great railroad centers in the 
United States. Denver, November 18; November 23, 1880. 
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His visits were known to have caused many to stir uneasily as the rumors 
of management changes and new investments circulated around St. Louis. A 
local paper reported that "Every man connected 11ith Gould lines in the 
city" (was) "so nervous that it required on their part the greatest 
heroism to dispose of routine business."10 Because of his continued 
success in South1vestern rail affairs and his complimentary rail investments, 
Gould exerted a substantial influence over the St. Louis econolllY. 11 
II. THE ILLINOIS AND ST. LOIJIS BRIDGE COMPANY 
During the early part of 1881, Gould sought to control the 
St. Louis Bridge Company. 'lith its bridge and tunnel properties, the 
Bridge Company connected St. Louis and the east bank of the Mississippi 
River, and thus was vital to the Missouri Pacific as an eastern outlet to 
the vJabash. Gould advertised that construction would soon begin on a new 
bridge across the Mississippi River which would bypass the St. Louis Company 
property. vlith a large bonded debt and with little earnings since its 
founding, the company quickly acceded to Gould's construction threat by 
leasing the bridge and tunnel properties jointly to the \'Jabash and the 
Missouri Pacific. Gould then enhanced the va 1 ue of the Bridge Company's 
seemingly worthless common stock by adjusting the interchange tolls. 12 
Coinciding with the acquisition of the St. Louis Bridge Company, Gould 
lOEvening Chronicle, t~arch 1, 1881, p. 2. 
llGrodinsky, ~Gould, pp. 340-341. 
12Grodinsky, ~Gould, pp. 338-340; Railway Review, June 25, 1881, 
p. 350. 
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proceeded to expand the Southwestern System. 
II I. THE SOUTHHESTERN SYSTEM EXPANSION PLANS, 1881 
The Southwestern System announced in January, 1881, a construction 
and consolidation program of one thousand miles. 13 Under Gould's direction 
the Iron ~1ountain gave up its goal of extending its lines southward into 
Texas from Texarkana, the International was stopped at Longview, Texas, 
and the Texas & Pacific at Texarkana, Texas, thus making each of these 
railroads a feeder to the others rather than a competitor. Gould then 
directed their construction energies toward extending the International 
southwest through San Antonio to Laredo and the Texas & Pacific westward 
to El Paso and eastward to New Orleans. The Missouri Pacific extended 
westward into Kansas while the Iron Mountain pushed toward Arkansas.14 
Gould envisioned another transcontinental railroad being built to the 
Pacific coast. However, as the Texas & Pacific expanded westward to11ard 
El Paso, Gould met a formidable opponent in Collis P. Huntington, 1qho was 
expanding his Southern Pacific eastward from California. "It would be 
folly to believe after the Southern Pacific reaches El Paso, that it ~1il1 
disband its perfectly organized working force," asserted the Austin, Texas, 
Daily Statesman. 15 To forestall the advance of the Southern Pacific, Gould 
instituted a suit against the Southern Pacific to prohibit the use of the 
13see Appendix, Table XVI. 
14Moody's Manual, p. 279. 
15september 24, 1880, p. 2. 
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right of wqy between Yuma and El Paso. Trying to bring more pressure on 
Huntington, Gould sought help from the Union Pacific, the Atlantic & 
Pacific, and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe in organizing a united front 
to invade California with a rail line through Northern Arizona.l6 Hith 
2,500 men employed in laying Texas & Pacific's rails westward, the Gould 
lines and his new allies were a significant threat to Huntington's 
California railroad monopoly. 17 
Huntington understood the nature of his opponent completely. 
Reportedly he once said: "I wouldn't go into the stock market against Gould 
for he would whip me at the game but when it comes to building and operating 
railroads in the most efficient and economical way, I can beat him, for 
that is 11\Y business." 18 To offset Gould's threat, Huntington threatened 
to expand the Centra 1 Pacific into l!ni on Pacific territory and bypass the 
Union Pacific completely. 19 Jarred by this counterattack, Gould halted his 
contruction plans and called a meeting to reconcile their differences. 
In January, 1882, Huntington and Gould reached an agreement. They jointly 
purchased slightly less than fifty per cent of the St. Louis & San Francisco, 
a line that was expanding in Missouri, Arkansas, and Northern Texas. The 
16Railway Review, August 20, 1881, p. 462. 
17Ibid., September 3, 1881, p. 492. 
18oscar Lewis, The Bin Four, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 
p. 220. - =-.:..;;L --
19Huntington controlled the Central Pacific while Gould still had 
an important interest in the Union Pacific by virtue of the Kansas Pacific-
Union Pac ific merger. 
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invade California as the "Frisco" controlled the Atlantic & Pacific a 
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feeder line to the "Frisco" that extended to the Colorado River. Hailed 
by the Railway Review "as the most important move that has been made in 
the Southwestern system of railroads for a long time," the Gould~Huntington 
agreement also allowed for joint usage of the Southern Pacific's track 
from El Paso to Texas & Pacific connection. 20 Peace was temporarily 
established in the Southwest. 
However, the peace did not last long. Huntington, whose plans 
included an eastern outlet for his Southern Pacific, was determined to 
reach the Mississippi Valley or some other point east of the river. He 
persuaded T. H. Pierce, a business ally in control of the Galveston, 
Harrisburg and San Antonio, to match the westward expansion of Gould's 
International Great Northern mile for mile, with a parallel line. Under 
this new pressure, Gould changed strategy. After twenty-five miles of 
track had been laid, he ordered the International to shift its line south 
from El Paso to Laredo, hoping thereby to open the Repub 1 i c of ~'!exi co to 
his Southwestern System. 21 Thus Gould bowed to the continuous pressure 
of Huntington's eastward expansion. Instead of extending the Texas and 
Pacificwest1~ard, he went south and hoped to offset his traffic loss ~lith a 
20commercial and Financial Chronicle, January 28, 1882, pp. 99-101; 
Railway Rev1ew, January 28, 1882, p. 51; February 8, 1882, p. 67. 
21 Julius Grodinsky, Transcontinental Railway Strategy, (Ph<iladelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1962), p. l69, 
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connection to ~!exico. Capitalizing on the changing economic conditions, 
Gould lessened his chances for financial losses in 1881. ~Jith the Inter-
national Great Northern building toward the Rio Grande, Gould ended the 
Missouri, Kansas and Texas' efforts to connect Dennison, Texas, with 
Taylor, Texas, on the Rio Grande thus eliminating duplication of rail 
lines. Acting in the interests of the Southwestern System, he sought 
approval for this curtailment at a special stockholders meeting. The 
Missouri, Kansas & Texas stockholders, without opposition, approved Gould's 
actions. 22 The stock market rise in the sun~er of 1881 afforded Gould 
the opportunity to sell his holdings in the Texas & Pacific and the Vlabash 
and obtain large profits. The timing was excellent, for by the latter 
part of 1881 the economic activity of the country began to decline as a 
result of railroad over-expansion. Rail earnings per mile dipped in 
comparison to the previous year and the increased railroad mileage ~1as not 
justified by the growth in population. 23 Consolidation of the SouthVJestern 
System and the elimination of his personal security holdings in the system, 
therefore, became more imperative as 1881 drew to a close. 
II I. THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOUTHVIESTERN SYSTEM 
Gould decided to reduce his stock and bond holdings in the South-
western System through his merger efforts. In doing so, Gould obtained 
22Grodinsky, ~Gould, p. 347. 
23see Appendix, Table XVII for rail earnings comparison. 
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profits, eliminated possible losses, and again demonstrated his brilliance 
in corporate finance. 
It was apparent early in 1881 that the cornerstone of the consoli-
dated system ~10uld be the Missouri Pacific. 24 Articles of agreement were 
filed with the State of Missouri to consolidate the following companies 
with the Missouri Pacific: the St. Louis & Lexington; the Kansas City & 
Eastern; the Lexington & Southern; the St. Louis, Kansas & Arizona; and 
the Kansas City & Leavenworth. The outcome of the merger vote was never 
. 25 in doubt since Jay Gould controlled all of the roads. The name of the 
company, the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, had a total capitalization 
of $30,000,000 and a system comprising 587 miles.26 
Speculative activity on the stock market increased throughout the 
fall of 1880 and the spring of 1881, coinciding with the rise in business 
activity. Taking advantage of the rapid increase in the value of Iron 
Mountain stock, Gould, who owned slightly less than fifty per cent of the 
shares, proposed a merger between the Iron ~1ountain and Texas & Pacific. 
Considerable controversy took place among the shareholders of the two 
companies, especially over terms which provided for a share-for-share 
exchange plus five per cent to Texas & Pacific stockholders. 27 
24Railway Review, April 30, 1881, p. 238. 
25see Appendix Tables XVIII-XIX. 
26 commercial and Financial Chronicle, July 30, 1880, p. 123; 
Railway Review, August21, 1880, p. 427. 
27Railway Revie~1, April 30, 1881 ,p. 242. 
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After apparently being accepted, the Texas & Pacific stockholders rejected 
the terms since the Iron Mountain did not have a land grant or other 
resources to compensate for the Texas & Pacific land grant. 
Frustrated in his first attempt, Gould 'Offered to merge the Iron 
Mountain into the Missouri Pacific. He proposed an exchange of three 
Missouri Pacific shares for four Iron Mountain shares. Hith Gould as a 
major stockholder in the Iron Mountain and the controlling stockholder in 
the Missouri, acceptance of the terms was assured and the Iron ~lountain 
combined with the Missouri Pacific.28 
Turning to the Missouri, Kansas & Texas, Gould issued an official 
notice in April, 1881, calling for a special stockholders meeting. 
According to the prearranged agenda, the participants were: 
21, 
1. To consider and act upon a proposed 1 ease of the railway 
company and the property of the ~li ssouri , Kansas g, Texas to the 
Missouri Pacific Railway Company. 
2. To consider and act upon a proposed lease of contract with 
the International Great Northern Railroad Company for the joint 
use of and occupancy by the Nissouri, Kansas & Texas of that portion 
of said International Great Northern Railroad Company's line 
commencing at the point of interchange of the two roads in 
Williamson or Miami County, Texas, and extending via Questin 
through to the Rio Grande. 
3. To consider and act upon a proposed lease or contract 
with the Texas & Pacific for the joint use and occupancy of that 
portion of the Texas & Pacific Railroad Company's line extending 
from Whitesboro to Fort' Worth. 
4. To consider and act upon a proposed contract to be submitted 
to said meeting, for the management and operation of the company's 
27Railway Revie1~, April 30, 1881 , p. 242. 
28Railway Review, April 30, 1881 ' p. 241 ; Raih~ay Gazette, August 
1881, p. 424. 
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railway, upon such terms as wi 11 secure to it the entire net 
earnings from its several pr2~erties, less current expenses for 
maintenance and betterments. 
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When the meeting got under way, a 1 ease with the Missouri Pacific 
for ninety-nine years was signed; however, the Missouri Pacific assumed only 
the responsibility for the operation of the road. i'lo mention was made of 
the funded debt. 
lvith the Missouri, Kansas & Texas leased to the · t~issouri Pacific, 
Gould sought to forestall any possible rivalry between the International 
Great Northern and Missouri, l<ansas & Texas by a merger. He suggested an 
exchange of one share of International stock for two shares of r~issouri, 
K~.nsas & Texas stock. The exchange rate was based on ·the market value of 
the two stocks prior to the merger. 30 Gould easily manipulated the 
exchange rate since he owned two thirds of the International's outstanding 
stock. 
Hith the western portion of the South~1estern System consolidated, 
Gould turned to the east and the Ne~1 Orleans Pacific. Absorption of the 
New Orleans Pacific by the Texas & Pacific was contemplated ever since 
Gould began construction on the New Orleans line. Upon completion of the 
1 ine, a merger was consummated with a share-for-share exchange with the 
Texas & Pacific as then surviving company. 31 
29Railway Review, April 23, 1881, p. 227. 
30commercial and Financial Chronicle, May 14, 1881, p. 526. 
31commercial and Financial Chronicle, June 4, 1881, p. 613. 
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Between 1879 and 1881, Gould became motivated by a primary desire 
to create a railroad monopoly in the Southwestern United States. He let 
no idea of business morality or personnel charity deflect him from this 
purpose.32 By the end of 1881, the monopoly was an accomplished fact, 
with a system in excess of 5,000 miles and a minimum personal investment. 
32Robert Edgar Riegel, The }tory of the \4estern Railroads, (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1926 , p. ITs-. -Hereafter c1ted as Riegel, 
!,I estern Rai 1 roads. For additional information concerning rai 1 consu111pti on 
and the Gould interlocking directorates, see Appendix Tables XX-XXII. 
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CHAPTER V 
A STOCK PRICE ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTHWESTERN SYSTEM, 
1879-1881 
An analysis of the Southwestern railroads stock price movement 
during the period of 1879-1881 reveals interesting data. During the 
time that Gould was building his Southwestern System, the stock prices 
of his rail lines were in an upward price trend. As Gould merged or 
leased each line, speculators pushed the stock prices to all-time highs. 
After Gould had secured his profits through mergers, stock prices fell 
rapidly. However, Gould still controlled the lines through his majority 
interest in the Missouri Pacific. 
I. THE MISSOURI PACIFIC RAILROAD 
Quoted prices for the Missouri Pacific shares prior to 1879 are not 
available in the financial papers of New York City. However, in September, 
1879, the Corrmercial and Financial Chronicle quoted the high and low price 
for the month as twelve dollars and two dollars respectively. Before 
Gould's efforts to acquire the Missouri Pacific from C. K. Garrison, the 
stock reached a high of approximately t1~enty dollars a share. It is not 
surprising then, in 1887 that the Pacific Railway Commission Examiner went 
into considerable detail to explain why Jay Gould paid $950 per share for 
the Missouri Pacific 11hich he purchased from Garrison. Control of the 
Missouri Pacific enabled Gould to eventually consummate his Kansas Pacific-
"':'--------_ 
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Union Pacific merger. The resulting profits justified his expenditure for 
the Missouri Pacific. In January, 1881, the price of Missouri Pacific 
stock reached a high of ninety dollars per share. During a period of 
thirteen months in which the stock had no listed quotations in the 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, the price increased a minimum of 
350 per cent, notwithstanding the Gould reorganization and the resultant 
increase in the number of shares outstanding. Prior to the eventual 
consolidation of 1881, the stock reached a high of $114. 
According to generally accepted theories of technical analysis 
prevalent today, the Missouri Pacific stock established non-parallel upward 
trend lines. These trend lines are represented by lines AB and AC as 
illustrated in Graph I. The significance of the trend lines reveals that 
the upward price trend was never violated until after the consolidation 
was completed. Thereafter, the significance of the violation lies in the 
assumption that the public demand for the Missouri Pacific stock ~1as 
lessening. The poor economic reports toward the latter part of 1881 and 
the loss of speculative interest after Gould's consolidation probably 
accounted for the drop in price. 
II. THE TEXAS AND PACIFIC RAILROAD 
Prior to 1880, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle listed no 
quotations for the Texas & Pacific. This is quite understandable since 
the Texas & Pacific stock was closely held by management and was in a 
difficult period. The first quote for the Texas & Pacific stock appeared 
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in February, 1880, at $47 per share. For the rest of 1880, the price 
fluctuated bet\•teen a high of $40 and a low of $34. By the latter part 
of 1880, the Gould interest in the Texas & Pacific was apparent, as prices 
reached $74 just prior to the consolidation of the ~1issouri Pacific and the 
Texas & Pacific in 1881. The Texas & Pacific appreciated approximately 
one hundred per cent over a period of nine months. Analysis of the Texas 
& Pacific chart pattern, as illustrated in Graph II, reveals an upward 
price channe 1 that was not broken unti 1 after the Missouri Pacific 
consolidation 18 1881. 
II I. THE l~ISSOURI, KANSAS AND TEXAS RAILROAD 
Analysis of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas presents a much clearer 
association between stock price movements and ,Jay Gould's activities. 
Breaking of the first trend line (shown as AB on Graph III) in late 1879 
indicates a definite upward swing in the price of the stock. Trend line 
CD presents additional proof of the strong demand for Missouri, Kansas & 
Texas stock which coincided with Gould's attempt to take control of the 
line. Throughout 1880, the price of the stock remained \~ithin the channel 
CD and EF, an indication of strong demand for the stock. Volume statistics, 
shown at the bottom of Graph III, confirms the demand for the stock. The 
corresponding increases and decreases in volume paralleled the rise and 
fall of the stock. Of significance is the fact that during each period 
that Gould was manipulating the market, the volume increased very sharply 
but dropped off when Gould had accomplished his goals. Breaking of the 
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upward trend 1 i ne CD occurred after the Missouri Pacific consolidation 
in 1881. 
IV. THE ST. LOUIS, IRON MOUNTAIN AN!J SOUTHERN RAILROAD 
!•lith Gould's purchase of the Missouri Pacific in November, 1879, the 
price of the Iron ~1ountain stock began to fluctuate ~1idely between an 
approximate high of $66 and a low of $35 as presented in Graph IV. More 
than likely the wide changes in price were a result of rumors or reports 
concerning the Iron ~·1ountain's relationship to the Missouri Pacific. Gould 
began to purchase 1 arge amounts of I ron Mountain stock during the 1 atter 
part of 1880, although he probably obtained smaller quantities of stock 
prior to that time. 
The upward trend (seen as line Al3) was never broken despite the 
fluctuating price pattern of the Iron r~ountain stock. Volume statistics 
correspond very closely to the upward movement of the stock. The high 
prices of February, 1880, and March, 1881, were accompanied by the highest 
volume of the period. The upward thrust coincided with the Iron Mountain-
Missouri Pacific merger indicating the speculative interest. Also since 
Gould owned a considerable amount of Iron Mountain stock, it can be safely 
assumed that he contributed greatly to this speculative activity. 
V. THE INTERNATIONAL GREAT NORTHEPJII RAILROAD 
Pricewise, little if any information was reported concerning the 
International prior to 1880. Nevertheless, Gould's influence in the 
International was very evident. The rapid price movements as shown in 
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Graph V were undoubtedly a speculator's delight. From a low of $37.60 in 
October, 1880, the price moved upward to a high of $92 within seven months. 
By the time the International merged with the Missouri, Kansas & Texas 
in June, 1881, Gould possessed sixty-seven per cent of the International's 
stock and undoubtedly contributed greatly to its speculative activity. 
VI. CON CL US I ON 
The preceeding graphs show a close relationship between Gould's 
market manipulations and the value of Gould's Southwestern rail stocks. 
An even more significant insight is given when the monthly highs of the 
Gould stocks are compared to the important events of the period. They 
are shown on Graph VI illustrating how Gould manipulated the stock prices 
to further his consolidation efforts in the Southwestern System. Hi thout 
a doubt, Gould utilized the stock market to achieve his pecuniary objectives. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE DELINE OF THE SOUTHWESTERN SYSTEM, 1882-1892 
Built in sparsely settled areas, the Southwestern System began to 
disintegrate as the excessive expansion and poor management policies of 
1881 exacted their toll. Continued financial problems after 1882 left Jay 
Gould with only a semblance of control in the Southwest by 1892. 
In 1882, the promise of considerable wheat traffic from California 
and the continued westward movement of immigrants caused the Texas & 
Pacific managers to express optimism over the company's future earnings. 
The railroad's management built special railroad cars to accommodate the 
immigrant traffic. "Where, a year ago, were no, or very few inhabitants, 
-there are now thriving towns and settlements," reported the Railway 
Review. 1 However, the optimism soon turned sour. The rail traffic failed 
to materialize, and in July, 1882, the company announced that no interest 
would be paid on the Land Grant Bonds. Neither did the management issue 
script for the unpaid interest as they had done in previous years.2 
In the same year, expansion of the competing narrow gauge Texas & 
St. Louis Railroad gave Jay Gould further concern. Had the Line been 
completed southward to Haco, Texas, and northward to Chicago as proposed, 
it v1ould have cut very deeply into the Southwestern monopoly. 3 Threats and 
1November 12, 1882, p. 65. 
2Railway Review, July 8, 1882, p. 392. 
3Railway Review, January 8, 1881, p. 20. 
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counter-threats between Gould and the Texas & St. Louis had begun as 
early as 1880. Gould this time, however, attempted to capture the 
essential rail line in the proposed Texas & St. Louis expansion route by 
acquiring the Gulf, Colorado, & Santa Fe. Unable to acquire the Gulf 
at low prices, Gould resorted to rate wars and refused to accept the 
through tickets sold by the line. However, the determined Gulf manage-
ment fought Gould successfully until 1886 when the Gulf merged with the 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe. Thus Gould lost his battle to acquire the 
Gulf. 
Other rate wars were soon in the offing. The Galveston, Harrisburg, 
& San Antonio, the Texas & New Orleans, and the Louisville & Western 
railroads--all either controlled by or friendly to Gould's enemy, Collis 
P. Huntington--announced that they would refuse to accept through bills of 
lading issued by the Gould lines. 4 t\t the same time the Galveston pressed 
for completion of its new 1 ine from Houston to El Paso, which waul d connect 
the Southern Pacific and by-pass the Texas & Pacific route to New Orleans.5 
Thus, when the line was completed in 1883, Gould failed in his effort to 
prevent Huntington from achieving his eastern outlet to the Mississippi 
Valley. Huntington's new Texas route dealt a blow to the Texas & Pacific, 
as little traffic originated along the Texas & Pacific tracks in the 
thinly settled area between Fort Worth and El Paso. The Gould system 
thus lost the interchange traffic coming from the west on the Southern 
$Railway Review, November 4, 1882, p. 624. 
5rbid., September 16, 1882, p. 531. 
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Pacific. 
Gould also failed in his attempt to control the ~1emphis & Little 
Rock, a long-standing competitor of the Iron Mountain. His legal suit 
was so outrageous that the presiding judge would not even consider asking 
the Memphis bondholders to enter into an inquiry which would eliminate 
their bond rights. Even though Gould used every 1 egal and fi nanci a 1 
technique possible, he was unable to gain control of the road. To 
recompense for the failure, he v1as forced to build a duplicating line to 
~1emphi s. 6 
In addition to these troubles, Gould went on the defensive as Hall 
Street suffered a panic in February, 1882.7 Contributing to the scare were 
rumors that Gould was over-extended in the "Bear Market." To offset 
such rumors and in a manner without precedent, Gould exhibited $53,000,000 
of par value stock to reporters. t~arket value of the stock was said to be 
in excess of $40,000,000. Actually what Gould revealed to astute observers 
was not l1is assets but the fact that he was short of cash and was therefore 
unable to support his holdings against any excessive public selling which 
would depress the stock prices. 8 Coupled with the panic on Hall Street 
came a decline in commodity prices. Record grain crops, together with a 
drop in the European market demand in 1882, sent farm prices sliding down-
ward. Shock waves from the squeeze on commodity speculators spilled over 
7New York Times, February 28, 1881, p. 8. 
--- ' 
8Railway Gazette, March 17, 1882, p. 169. 
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into the stock market, and Gould stocks declined with the rest of the 
market. 
Troubles continued to plague Gould after 1882. Early in 1883, 
Gould's hold on the Habash was jeopardized by rumors which circulated to 
the effect that the road needed money. Ne1~spapers reported that 1 arge 
amounts of Habash commercial paper, bearing the signatures of Gould, 
Russell Sage, and Sidney Dillon, \~ere outstanding and unpaid. 9 The 
effect of the rumors eventually forced the Habash into receivership, but 
Gould retained control by appointing himself as receiver by using the 
commercial paper debt. 
In the Southwest, Gould was also in trouble. To prevent fore-
closure and managerial loss of the Texas & Pacific, Gould used Missouri 
Pacific funds to pay $1,250,000 in unpaid bond interest to Texas & Pacific 
bondholders. 10 Thus, Gould kept control of the Texas & Pacific. 
In the midst of all these financial problems, Gould also lost his 
influence in the Union Pacific by not heeding certain legal requirements 
in the Thurman Act of 1878. The act required setting aside 25 per cent 
of the Union Pacific's income for repayment funds advanced by the federa 1 
government. Gould failed to set aside these funds and he was forced to 
relinquish control by Congress in 1884. 
Gould's fortune ~1aned even further in 1884. Trying to recoup his 
9Railway Gazette, December 1, 1882. 
1°Richard O'Connor, Gould ~1illions, (New York: Doubleday & Company, 
1962), p. 230. Hereafter cited as O'Connor, Gou1d. 
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position, he misjudged the downward stock market trend and brought himself 
closer to the brink of financial collapse. Unknown to Gould, James Keene, 
Henry N. Smith, Charles Hoerishoffer, and several other leading Wall 
Street speculators, all united to "break" the leading financier by 
depressing the value of Gould's stocks. Stock prices dropped to "bank-
ruptcy levels" even though Gould tried to support the sagging market. 
However, he could not overcome the trend. Seemingly beaten, he sent his 
emissary to the speculators led by Keene.ll Much to their astonishment, 
Keene and his followers were presented, not with a plea for terms, but 
with an ultimatum. Shown a document that assigned all of Jay Gould's 
wealth to his heirs, the Keene group were informed that he would soon 
publish his notice of default. If Gould declared bankruptcy, all hopes of 
profit would be eliminated. Thus Keene and his fellow speculators decided 
to sign an agreement that became Gould's financial salvation. The specu-
lators agreed to purchase from Gould 40,000 shares of Western Union stock 
for $2,500,000, thereby giving Gould enough cash to satisfy his creditors. 
However, as far as Keene and his friends were concerned. Gould was 
finishect. 12 
11~1athew Josephson, The Robber Barrens, (New York: Harcourt, Brace 
& Company), p. 234. -
12o•connor, Gould, p. 234. 
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Gould, obviously, had other ideas. He lcnew through his informants 
that Keene and his followers had sold 11 Short1113 1>1issouri Pacific stock. 
With a large percentage of Missouri Pacific already under his control, 
Gould proceeded to use the newly acquired $2,500,000 to buy more Missouri 
Pacific stock. Up went the price even higher. Unable to cover their 
positions and now completely routed, they bought enough stock from Gould 
in the 90's to return the stock they had borrowed to sell short. 14· 
Gould reduced other debts in the summer market rally of 1884. 
However, he also announced his retirement from active participation in 
stock market speculation at that time. Even though Hall Street operators 
were skeptical about the statement, the strain of the previous months 
had been too severe on Gaul d and he never fully recovered from the near 
disasters. l.S 
Labor troubles struck the Southwestern System in 1885. Wage cuts 
and dismissals occurred as a business depression cycle set in. The Knights 
of Labor went on strike against the Gould lines and vowed to stay off the 
job until previous wage cuts were restored. Labor unrest grew into violence 
in 1886 and halted all transportation operations. In an era of public 
hostility to labor unions, Gould was able to break the strike by bringing 
13Keene and his friends borrowed stock and soldthis stock hoping 
that the large amount of stock put up for sale would depress the price as 
a result of excess supply. Then when prices were low, they would repurchase 
sufficient stock to replace the stock they had borrowed. This technique 
is referred to as 11 se 11 i ng short. 11 
14o•connor, Gould, p. 234. 
15rbid. 
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non-union "scabs" to replace the strikers. Formation of labor unions on 
the Gould lines was limited for many years thereafter. However, the labor 
troubles were costly to the railroads as business activity dropped 
sharply during the period of turmoil. 
Throughout the years after 1881, Gould diverted traffic and mani-
pulated freight rates to the advantage of the Missouri Pacific, the only 
railroad in which he had significant security holdings. Money that should 
have gone into property improvements had been diverted to the ~1issouri 
Pacific or used to finance rate wars in the Southwest. Continued manipu-
lations finally forced the ~1issouri, Kansas & Texas and the Texas & Pacific 
into receivership in 1888 and 1885 respectively, thereby forcing Gould 
to expend his energies in trying to gain control of these lines again. 
From 1888 to 1892, Gould made several attempts to re-establish his 
hold over the Texas & Pacific and the r,lissouri, Kansas ~.Texas. In 1889, 
he emerged as the major stockholder in the Texas & Pacific, but he failed 
in his efforts to resecure the Missouri, Kansas & Texas which now became 
a competitor to the Gould lines. The cornerstone of the old Southwestern 
System, the Missouri Pacific, expanded westward under Gould's direction. 
However, before Gould could res tore the rai 1 road system to its former 
size, he became seriously ill in November, 1892. 
Outside the Gould mansion a "death ~latch" started on December 1, 
1892. Reporters from all the leading New York newspapers gathered and 
sent messengers to their respective offices whenever news was made 
available. The next day at 9:15 a.m., Jay Gould died. 16 Hithin a fe\~ 
16o•connor, Gould. p. 284. 
~~- ---_ --
,---- = 
t;;-- ----
~---
62 
months after his death, the Southwestern System began to disappear. It 
was never reconstructed by his successors. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
"It is one of the incidents of Jay Gould's scheming plans to obtain 
control of a vast network of trans-Mississippi roads," wrote a New York 
Times reporter in 1881. 1 Gould acquired railroads at such a rapid rate 
that the same paper in 1881 exclaimed: "Gould is on the point of destroying 
the country. u2 As he began his drive to become the United States' 1 eadi ng 
railroad baron, Gould received great public condemnation, but he antici-
pated it. Regardless of public opinion, Gould was a successful businessman. 
The key to his success was his knowledge of corporate finance, and he 
understood the "maze" better than anyone else. 
After failing in his first attempt to merge the Union Pacific and 
Kansas Pacific, Gould sought control of the Missouri Pacific. Aware of 
the Missouri Pacific's strategic location, Gould paid far more for the 
line than the line's inherent physical value. Control of the Missouri 
Pacific enabled Gould eventually to consummate the Union Pacific-Kansas 
Pacific merger. However, it is worth noting that Gould did not include 
the Missouri Pacific in the Union Pacific-Kansas Pacific merger. \~ith a 
limited stock capitalization and a strategic location, the Missouri 
Pacific offered Gould other financial opportunities. 
l"Railroad Interests and the Public Interests," New York Times, 
January 20, 1880, p. 4. ---
2Nel~ York Times, February 23, 1881, p. 4. 
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Railroad expansion ceased with the depression of 1873. The South-
western railroads extended from town to town and then stopped because of 
a lack of funds to complete their building programs. Railroad securities 
sold at discounts ranging up to ninety per cent of par value. Defining 
a corporation as a body of men brought together for a common purpose, 
Gould led the speculators who proceeded to buy, build, and connect the 
fragmented Southwestern rai 1 roads. 3 Those roads that could not be purchased 
outright were incorporated through the use of rate wars, law suits, dupli-
cation of rail lines, repudiation of debt, and other maneuvers. 
After the Southwestern System took form, Gould began to move his 
personal capital out of these railroad securities in order to finance his 
other business ventures. He used the stock market whenever possible to 
secure the optimum profit and release from a particular venture, but at 
the same time, continued to maintain managerial control of the Southwestern 
System largely through his strong forceful personality. 
Gould was strongly tempted by the prospect of securing monopolistic 
control in the Southwest. However, he was a speculative capitalist rather 
than a corporate manager; long range management duties, coupled 11ith 
limited profits, probably did not appeal to him. Neither was Gould 
considered to be a bui 1 der; primarily he was pictured as a wrecker and a 
buyer during panics. 4 He did, however, bring a railroad system to the 
Southwest that still exists today. Whether the cost was excessive compared 
3Railroad Review, March 5, 1881, p. 127. 
4oenver Tribune, November 30, 1880, p. 1. 
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to the results obtained cannot be ascertained. 
The Gould Southwestern System was the result of one man's work. It 
was built and controlled by Gould's forceful personality. For several 
years in the 1880's he had only limited investments in the Southwestern 
railroads except for the Missouri Pacific, although he continued to direct 
the road's destinies. vJhen he died in 1892, the concept of the South-
western System died with him. Only with a strong and forceful business 
personality could the re-recreation of the Southwestern System be attempted. 
The Gould heirs were lacking in all these essential traits. 
It may be useful to draw a parallel between Gould's scheme and a 
modern railroad financier's plan in the Southwest. \1illiam G. Marbury, 
astonishingly little-known in modern rail circles, has been attempting 
in recent years to build a new Southwestern System that will encompass 
25,000 miles of rail lines from Chicago south to St. Louis and New Orleans, 
and west to San Francisco. 5 If completed, the result will be a corporate 
pyramid of $3,100,000,000. 6 
To many observers, Marbury's plan seems to be a dream. However, 
in January, 1967, the Missouri Pacific gained access to Chicago by 
purchasing the Chicago, Eastern Illinois Railroad with court approval _7 
~·1i ssouri Pacific also hal ds approximately ten per cent of the Santa Fe's 
5
"Bill Marbury Strives to Build A Mammoth \~estern Rail Pyramid," 
Wall Street Journal, October 11, 1968, pp. 1,18. 
6see Appendix, Table XXVIII. 
7
"High Court Clears Way for MoPac to Buy C&EI, for Line into 
Chicago," Wall Street Journal, January 10, 1967, p. 26. 
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voting stock and, in addition, controls the Texas & Pacific Railroad. 
As was Jay Gould, ~4arbury is variously described as aloof, 
obstinate, and ruthless. Under his direction the Mississippi River 
Corporation, parent organization of the Missouri Pacific, increased its 
profits from $12.6 million in 1961 to $26.3 million in 1966. 8 But unlike 
Gould, Marbury is a proven manager. Control and development are his main 
managerial interests. Acceptable to both the business community and to 
the private investor, Marbury may succeed in building his "mammoth" 
western rail system. He appears to be strong in areas where Jay Gould 
was weak-•i n management and development of corporate properties. Thus, 
a new Southwestern System may again be reconstructed. Hopefully the new 
system will serve the public instead of speculative personal interests. 
8Wall Street Journal, January 10, 1967, p. 26. 
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TABLE I ~--·_:<-~--:~_-_: ' 
~;· 
ORGANIZATION PLAN OF THE KANSAS CITY POOL1 
Kansas Pacific Value in 
Securities Par Value Exchange Rate New Stock 
Stock $9,600,000 12.5% $1,200,000 
Floating Debt 1,200,000 par 1 ,200,000 
Unsubordi nated 
Income Bonds 227,000 50% 113 ,500 
Subordinated 
In come Bonds 4,048,350 30% 1,214,350 
Second Land 
Grant Bonds 1,055,000 50% 527,500 
Arkansas Valley 
Railway Bonds 570,000 50% 285,000 
Leavenworth Branch 
Bonds 630,000 50% 315,000 
$17,330,350 $4,855,350 
-------
1Pacific Railway Report: 1887, p. 456. 
,.__~-~~-
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TABLE II 
GOULD SECURITY HOLDINGS IN THE KANSAS CITY POOL AGREEMENT 1 
Kansas Pacific 
Securities Amount Par Value 
Stock 42,000 shares $ 420,000 
Unsubordi nated 
95 bonds 2 Income Bonds 47,500 
Subordinated 
2,143.7 bonds4 Income Bonds 2,143,700 
Second Land 
Grant Bonds 160 bonds 160 ,000 
1Pacific Railway Report: 1887, pp. 456-77. 
2$500 par value bonds. 
Estimated 
Cost 
$ 52,500 
23,7503 
643, no5 
80,0006 
3Estimated at 50 per cent according to testimony before the United 
States Pacific Railway Commission: 1887. 
4The decimal represents $700 par value. The figure 2,143 represents 
$1,000 par value bonds. 
5Estimated at 30 per cent according to testimony before the United 
States Pacific Railway Commission: 1887. 
6Author's estimate. The figure is based on probable prices during 
the purchase of the other Kansas Pacific securities. 
... - "-~- -
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TABLE III 
TI-lE WABASH-ST.LOUIS, KANSAS CITY & NORTHERN CONSOLIDATIONl 
Route 
Toledo to East St. Louis 
Chicago and Paducah '"' 
Chicago and Strawn ••• 
Eeel River ...•....• 
Decatur to Quincy & Hannibal 
Other branches •.•.•.. 
Total Wabash Mileage 
St. Louis & Kansas City • • 
t1oberly to Ottumwa • • • • . 
Brunswick to Pattsburg ••. 
Pattsburg to Council Bluffs •. 
Lexington Junction to St. Joseph 
Quincy Missouri & Pacific 
Other branches • . • . . . . • . 
Total St. Louis, Kansas City & 
Northern & Mileage 
Consolidated Length 
Miles 
433 
157 
95 
94 
201 
68 
1,048 
275 
131 
81 
146 
76 
102 
37 
--
848 
1 ,896 mi 1 es 
72 
1commercial and Financial Chronicle, November 15, 1879, p. 513. 
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TABLE IV 
1879 GOULD PURCHASE OF MISSOURI PACIFIC HITH RELATED ROADS 1 
Railroad Company Securities Price Total Cost 
Missouri Pacific 4 ,000 shares $950 per $3,800,000 
share 
Kansas Central 385 bonds 80% plus 310,992.47 
interest 
Kansas Central 2 ,251 shares $18 per sl1are 45,000.00 
Approximate 
1Pacific Railway Report: 1887. 
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TABLE V 
KANSAS PACIFIC RAILWAY C0~1PANY1 
Ne1~ York, January 14, 1880 
Memorandum of terms of agreement for consolidation of Union Pacific 
with Kansas Pacific, in which the Denver Pacific, St. Joseph and Western 
and Union Pacific, Eastern Division, are included. 
All necessary papers and any further agreements to be prepared by 
Judge Dillon on his return. The Union Pacific, with all their respective 
liabilities, are to be put together at par of their respective capitals -
$36,762,300 and $10,000,000 - to which is to be added the capital of the 
Denver Pacific, $4,000,000, making the capital of the Union P2cific 
Railway Company, as the new line shall be called $51,762,300. 
The Denver Pacific capital, now an asset of the Kansas Pacific, 
is to be used, after conversion into Union Pacific Railway stock, to 
pay for shares and bonds of St. Joseph and Western Railroad and St. Joseph 
Bridge, as hereafter states, and for other purposes. 
The St. Joseph and Western first-mortgage bonds and stocks, to the 
extent of the controlling interest in the same, to be bought of parties 
now owning it, at par for bonds, and $20 a share for stock, payment to be 
made in Union Pacific Railway stock at par. 
The road to be leased to the Union Pacific Railway Company for the 
interest on first mortgage bonds, or otherl'lise as may be determined. 
The bridge at St. Joseph is to be bought of parties now owning controlling 
interest in the bonds and shares of same, at par for bonds with the shares 
thrown in, and payment to be made either in shares of Union Pacific Railway 
at par, or Kansas Pacific consolidated-mortgage bonds at par. 
The Union Pacific, eastern division, is to be taken at cost to 
Mr. Gould, and paid for in same securities that he gave, viz, about one-
half in Kansas Pacific consolidated-mortgage bonds and one-half in new 
Union Pacific 6 per cent trust bonds, both at par. 
R.S. 
,Jay Gould 
Fred' k L. Ames 
E. H. Baker 
F. G. Dexter 
Sidney Di 11 on 
E. Atkins 
if>acific Raih1ay Report: 1887, p. 61. 
2An apparent error, this should read $50,762,300. 
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TABLE VI 
SECURITIES DELIVERED TO JAY GOULDl 
February 16, 1880, delivered to Jay Gould in payment for 
the following securities: 
St. Joseph and Pacific first-mortgage bonds 
and scrip at par .•••.•..••.•• 
Kansas and Nebraska Railway Company's first 
mortgage bonds and scrip ••.•••.•• 
Kansas and Nebraska Railway Company's second 
mortgage bonds and scrip ••••.•••. 
Kansas Centra 1 Ra i1 road bonds • . • . . . • 
Kansas Central Railroad stock, 2,421 shares 
St. Joseph and Denver City receiver's 
certificates ••.••••..•.••.. 
St. Joseph Bridge Building Company bonds •• 
St. Joseph Bridge Building Company stock, 
4,000 shares •.•••••...•.. 
St. Joseph and Hestern stock, 15,162 shares 
at 20 • • . • . • . • • . . • 
Hastings and Grand Island Bonds 
Hall County bonds .•.•• 
Total (34,641 shares)2 
1 P aci fi c Railway Report: 1887, p. 381. 
2$100 par value Union Pacific stock. 
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$1,020,204.23 
729,820.00 
24,700.00 
479,000,00 
59,000.00 
784,000.00 
307,240.00 
60,204.25 
$3,464,168.48 
ti __ :- ' -
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TABLE VII ~:....0..::---: --
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STATISTICS--UNION PACIFIC & KANSAS PACIFIC MERGER 1 
Union Pacific Kansas Pacific 
Miles of Road $ 1 ,039 $ 780 
-----
Gross Earnings for Year 12,904,857 4,904,857 
Net Earnings for Year 6,506,562 1,690,993 
----
Other Income 2,282,418 60,617 
Debt Due United States 45,657,599 10,919,683 
Other Bonded Debt 50,404,000 22 '130 '100 
Interest Accrued and Due 869,891 5,621 ,366 
Bills and Accounts Payable 4,561,845 1 ,219,080 
Capita 1 Stock 36,762,300 9 ,689 ,950 
Assets besides Road & Equipment 27,123,902 10,427,283 
Annual Interest other than ---- ------
United States 4,234,133 1,665,060 
Earnings Applicable to Dividends 
and Sinking Fund 4,214,816 85,617 
l~ailway Review, January 24, 1-80, p. 39. 
TABLE VIII 
FUNDED DEBT OF THE TEXAS & PACIFIC - JI'.AY 31, 18801 
Type of Bond 
1st Mortgage Bonds-Eastern Division 
Consolidated Mortgage Bonds-East Division 
Income and Land Grant Bonds 
Old Land Grant Bonds, Scrip, & Misc. 
Interest Scrip-Redeemable in land or stock 
Texas School Fund Loan 
Total Funded Debt 
TABLE IX 
Amount 
$ 3,481,000 
7,619,000 
8,177,000 
321 ,343 
1,552,570 
181 ,677 
$21 ,332,590 
RAIL LINES OWNED BY THE TEXAS & PACIFIC- MAY 31, 18802 
Area 
Shreveport, La., to Ft. v,lorth, Texas 
Texarkana to Sherman, Texas 
Texarkana Junction to Marshall 
Total Miles 
Miles 
219.69 
155. 12 
69.05 
443.86 
1Railway Gazette, August 13, 1880, p. 436. 
2rbid. 
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TABLE X 
RAILROAD EQUIPMENT OF THE MISSOURI, KANSAS, AND TEXAS 18791 
Quantity 
88 
34 
20 
5 
798 
360 
315 
96 
48 
1 
1 
20 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Type of Rolling Stock 
Engines 
Passenger Cars 
Baggage Cars 
Postal Cars 
Box Cars 
Stock Cars 
Coal Cars 
Flat Cars 
Caboose Cars 
Pay Car 
Business Cars 
Dump Cars 
Boarding Cars 
Magazine Car 
Derrick Car 
Tool Car 
Pi 1 e Driver Car 
[Railway Gazette, November 12, 1880, p. 599. 
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TABLE XI 
FUNDED DEBT OF THE t~ISSOURI, KANSAS, AND TEXAS 18791 
~of Bond 
Union Pacific, Southern Branch Bonds 
Tebo & Neosho Bonds 
Hannibal & Central Missouri 1st t~ortgage 
Bonds 
Hannibal & Central Missouri 2nd Mortgage 
Bonds 
M. K. T. Consolidated Bonds 
M. K. T. Income Bonds & Scrip 
TABLE XII 
Amount 
$ 2,315,000 
349,000 
768,000 
32,000 
14,752,000 
7,571 ,533 
$25,787,533 
RAIL LINES Oi!NED BY THE mSSOURI, KANSAS, & TEXAS 18792 
Area 
Hanni ba1 to Dennison, Texas 
Ho1 den, r~o., to Pao1 a, Kansas 
Parsons, Kansas to ,Junction City, Kansas 
Total Miles 
Miles 
575.5 
54.0 
156.5 
786.0 
1Rai1way Gazette, November 12, 1880, p. 599. 
2Ibid. 
L__ 
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TABLE XIII 
RAILROAD EQUIPMENT OF THE ST. LOUfS, 
I RON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN 1879 
Quantity 
121 
46 
1 
24 
7 
l, 138 
424 
1 ,029 
48 
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
Engines 
Passenger Cars 
Sleeper Car 
Baggage, Mail, & Express Car 
Pullman Cars (50% interest) 
Box Cars 
Stock Cars 
Flat Cars 
Caboose Cars 
Director's Car 
Boarding Car 
Derrick Car 
Wrecking Cars 
Pile-Driving Car 
1Railway Gazette, ~1arch 26, 1880, p. 177. 
L 
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TABLE XIV 
FUNDED DEBT OF THE ST. LOUIS, IRON t·10UNTAIN & SOUTHERN 1879 l 
Type of Bond 
Various Divisional Bonds 
First Preferred Income Bonds 
Second Preferred Income Bonds 
TABLE XV 
!\mount 
$21,925,000 
4,054,937 
4,088 '720 
$30,068,657 
RAIL LINES Ol.JNED BY THE ST. LOUIS, I RON MOUNTAIN & SOUTHERN 2 
1879 
Area 
St. Louis to Texarkana, Texas 
Bismark, ~·1issouri, to Belmont 
Popular Bluff, Missour, to Bird's Point 
Mineral Point, ~1issouri, to Potost 
Total Mileage 
1Railwa,y Gazette, ~1arch 26, 1880, p. 177. 
2rbid. 
Miles 
490.0 
120.0 
71.0 
3.5 
684.5 
81 
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TABLE XVI 
ANNOUNCED EXPANSION OF THE GOULD SOUTH¥ESTERN RAILROAD 
SYSTEM, JANUARY, 1881 
Branch Route 
St. Louis & Southern Parsons, Kansas to 
fl ranch Arkansas City 
Kansas, Arizona & Leroy, Kansas, to 
Pacific Branch vii chi ta, Kansas 
Kansas, Arizona & Ottawa, Kansas, to 
Pacific Branch Topeka, Kansas 
Lexington & Southern Nevada, t~i ssouri to 
Branch Joplin, Missouri 
Jefferson City, Jefferson City, 
Lebanon & Missouri to Lamar, 
Southwestern Branch t~i ssouri 
I GN Connection t4hi tesboro, Texas, to 
Fort Harth, Texas 
Jefferson City, Greenville, Texas, to 
Lebanon & Mineo 1 a, Texas 
Southwestern Branch 
I GN Connection Fort Worth, Texas, to 
t~aco to Georgetown, 
Texas 
Texas & Pacific- San Antonio, Texas, to 
IGN Joint Usage Laredo, Texas, and 
Georgetown, Texas, to 
San Antonio, Texas 
1Railway Review, Feeruary 12, 1881, p. 87. 
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Distance 
110 miles 
103 miles 
42 miles 
65 miles 
125 miles 
70 miles 
50 miles 
150 miles 
154 miles 
135 mi 1 es 
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TABLE XVI I 
AVERAGE EARNINGS PER MILE OF RAILROAD l 
Month Per Cent of Increase over Previ~us Year 
18801 1881 
January 16.7% ( 7.0% ) 
February 12.5% (10.1%) 
March 19.0% ( 6.1 %) 
April 14.3% 2.9% 
r1ay 10.4% 3.5% 
June 16.7% 13.4% 
July 9.7% 4.8% 
August 12.7% 6.9% 
September 3.6% ( 1 .6%) 
October ( 0.2%) 5.1 %) 
November 4.4% ( 1. 3%) 
December 2.4% 6.2% 
1commercial and Financial Chronicle, February 4, 1881. 
2Ibid. February 3, 1882. 
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TABLE XVI II 
t>1ISSOURI PACIFIC CONSOLIDATION OF 18801 
Debt 
1st Mortgage Bonds 
2nd Mortgage Bonds 
3rd Mortgage Bonds 
Real Estate 
Carondelet Branch 
Total 
Branch Bonds 
$ 7,000,000 
2,573,000 
4,500,000 
800,000 
250,000 
$15,123,000 
Missouri Pacific $ 409,000 
650,000 
348,000 
St. Louis & Lexington 
Kansas City & Eastern 
St. Louis, Kansas, & Arizona 
Lexington & Southern 
leavenworth, At chi son & Northwest 
Total 
1 ,200,000 
1 ,050,000 
479,000 
$ 4,136,000 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, p. 454. 
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TABLE XIX 
GOULD HOLDINGS IN THE MISSOURI PACIFIC CONSOLIDATION] 
Company 
t1issouri Pacific 
Kansas City & Eastern 
St. Louis & Lexington 
Lexington & Southern 
St. Louis, Kansas City 
& Atchison 
Kansas Ci ty & 
Leavenworth 
Owner 
Jay Gould 
Jay Gould 
Jay Gould e, 
P. M. Schmidt 
Jay Gould 
Jay Gould 
Jay Gould 
Shares 
5,028 
3,660 
4,845 
10,500 
11,118 
16,801 
85 
The above shares represent more than 66 per cent of the total outstanding 
stock voting in the Missouri Pacific Consolidation of 1880. 
1commercial and Financial Chronicle, August 21, 1880, p. 223. 
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TABLE XX "'~:--;:-=":'_::-~-~-=c~ 
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,___ ------RAIL CONSU~WTION 1872-1881 l 
Year Total Tons Construction r~ai ntenance 
1872 1,530,850 740,500 790,350 
; 1873 1,148,849 392,000 756,849 
I 
I 1874 837,695 192,000 645,695 -------
• 1875 810,770 151,000 659,770 I 1876 879,916 231,000 648,916 ~ 
' 1877 784,744 206,000 522,700 
1879 1 '157 ,420 440,000 717,420 
1880 1,674,235 688,000 986,235 
1881 2,230,422 960,000 1 ,279 ,442 
1Railway Gazette, October 27, 1882, p. 662. 
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TABLE XXI ~.~~; 
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RAIL CONSUMPTION 1872-1881 1 
Aggregate Total Rail Tons Per Cent of Track Renewal 
1872 7,942,500 10.30% --·-
1873 8,683,000 9.02% 
----
1874 9,075,000 7.34% 
1875 9,267,000 7.33% 
1876 9,418,000 7.10% 
1877 9,649,000 5.92% 
1878 9,855,000 6. 56% 
1879 10,215,000 7.24% 
1880 10,384,000 9.52% 
' I 1881 11 ,385,000 11. 16% I 
I ----· -- ··~-
I 
lRailway Gazette, October 27, 1882, p. 662. 
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TABLE XXII 
UNION PACIFIC BOARD OF DIRECTORS-18801 
Fredrick L. Ames 
Carlos S. Greeley 
Ezra H. Baker 
Elisha Atkins 
F. Gordon Baxter 
Sidney Dillon 
G. 1~. Dodge 
Russell Sage 
Jay Gould 
So 1 on Humphreys 
David Dows 
Thomas T. Eckert 
William L. Scott 
S. H. H. Clark 
John Sharp 
1Railway Review, January 31, 1880, p. 51. 
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TABLE XXIII 
. l MISSOURI PACIFIC BOARD OF DIRECTORS-1880 (Consolidated Company) 
Jay Gould Oliver Garrison 
Sidney Di 11 on D. K. Ferguson 
Russell Sage \~eb. 11. Sammuel 
George J. Forrest H. H. Clark 
lvilliam F. Buckley J. L. Stephens 
Thomas T. Eckert L. T. Smith 
Fredrick L. Ames 
1
Railway Review, August 2, 1880, p. 427. 
89 
-
-
--
90 
TABLE XXIV §_~~"':'-~--~ 
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ST. LOUIS, I RON t~OUNTAIN & SOUTHERN BOARD OF DI RECTORS-1881 1 
Jay Gould Sidney Di 11 on 
Henry C. Narquand Samuel Shethar 
Henry Hhe 1 en Thomas T. Eckert 
Russell Sage George B. McClellan 
Joseph S. Lowry Rufus J. Lockland -
-
John T. Tery R. C. Kerns 
-== 
1 Railway Revie~1, March 5, 1881, p. 120 
TABLE XXV 
MISSOURI PACIFIC BOARD OF DIRECTORS-18811 
Jay Gould 
Russell Sage 
Sidney Di 11 on 
Hilliam F. Buckley 
Thomas T. Eckert 
George F. Forrest 
Samuel Sloan 
Fredrick L. Ames 
D. K. Ferguson 
i/eb ~1. S amue 1 
S . H. H. Cl ark 
Joseph L. Stephens 
L. T. Smith 
1Railway Review, r1arch 5, 1881, p. 130. 
---
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TABLE XXVI 
t4ISSOURI, KANSAS & TEXAS BOARD OF DIRECTORS-1881 l 
Jay Gould 
Sidney Di 11 on 
G. J. Forrest 
Thomas T. Eckert 
M. S. ~1cCready 
A. G. Dulman 
Samuel Sloan 
Thomas W. Pearsall 
Fredrick L. Ames 
Frank s. Bond 
T. s. Hays 
C. H. Pratt 
Judge David Kelso 
1Railway Review, Hay 21, 1881, p. 282. 
-----
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TABLE XXVII 
TEXAS & PACIFIC BOARD OF DIRECTORS-18821 
Jay Gaul d H. ~1. Hoxie 
s. T. Walters R. s. Hayes 
Russ en Sage T. T. Eckert 
Jas. P. Scott A. L. Hopkins 
vi. c. Hall E. H. Perkins, ,Jr. 
T. S. Bond E. B. ~lhee 1 ock 
Charles 0. Baird D. Fe ·r sen he 1 d 
Fredrick L. Ames George J. Gould 
J. C. Brown 
1Railway Revie~1, September 16, 1882, p. 531. 
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~Vl.RRURY CORPORATE PYR.llJ1I D FOR PROPOSED 
HESTE RN RAIL SYSTD1 · 
t'1ississippi River 
Corporation 
$190 Million in 
Assets 
Missouri Pacific Texas & Pacific 
Railroad Company I-- Rai 1way Company 
$1.3 Billion in 
Asset · 
.. 
Atchison, Topeka 
& Santa Fe R.R. 
$1.8 Billion in 
Assets 
94 --------
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